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ARGUMENT

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY DECIDED DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
On Appeal, Appellant (Lee) contends that the district court failed to properly

decide Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment for two primary reasons: first, it was
legally impossible for Lee to have known of Dr. Williams' negligence/fault because there
@

were two potentially negligent events that might have caused the injury during the time
period when Lee claims to have been unaware of her injury; and second, as discussed in
Lee's Appellate Brief and will not be addressed in this brief, there were genuine issues of
fact about when Lee learned of Dr. Williams' Negligence/Fault.
As to the when Lee learned of Dr. Williams negligence/fault, Appellee (Dr.

@

Williams) responds that because of the unique medical circumstances presented in this
case, it was possible for Lee to learn of Dr. Williams' potential negligence without first
having knowledge of a physical injury. See Appellee Br. at 19.
Regardless of the unique medical circumstances in this case, under a clear reading
of the applicable law, knowledge of an actual injury must precede knowledge of a
tortfeasor's fault for purposes of determining when a claimant knows of her "legal
injury". Although Lee knew that the first RhoGAM shot was not administered during her

4j

pregnancy, because there were questions of fact about when Lee discovered her injury,
and Lee sought to offer evidence of a second negligent event which could have caused
her injury, it was legally incorrect to determine that Lee had knowledge of negligence
before a conclusion had been reached about when she learned of her injury.

t..;J
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The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, tempered by the discovery
rule, that a defendant medical provider may raise against a claim of medical negligence.

Ci)

See Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-404. A patient must file her medical malpractice suit within

two years after the patient discovers or through the use of reasonable diligence should
have discovered her "legal injury". See Utah Code Ann. §78B-3-404(1). Knowledge of
"legal injury" refers to the date upon which the injured patient knows or should know two
things: (1) that he or she has sustained an injury; and (2) that the injury may be
attributable to negligence. Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996) (quoting
Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P .2d 144, 148 (Utah 1979) (the two-year limitations period "does

@)

not commence to run until the injured person knew or should have known that he had
sustained an injury and that the injury was caused by negligent action.")).
If two negligent events may have caused a Plaintiffs injury, it is not until the

patient knows or should know of an actual injury that she can even determine whether
there was negligence at the hands of the doctor and which negligent event might have
caused her injury.
[W]hen a patient has received multiple medical treatments or undergone
numerous medical procedures, and subsequently suffers unforeseen complications
or reactions, he may suspect negligence. This patient, however, has not
discovered his legal injury because, while he is aware that he is injured, and even
if he is aware that negligence may be the source, he has not sufficiently tied it to
its source in a medical procedure. Therefore, we hold, based on the language of
the Health Care Malpractice Act and our case law interpreting it, while a patient
may not be required to discover the specific individual responsible for his injury,
he must discover the causal event before the statute of limitations begins to run.
Additionally, the policy underlying our previous interpretations of the Health
Care Malpractice Act also requires that the statute of limitations not be triggered
until the patient discovers which medical event allegedly caused his injury.
In Foil we explained that the statute of limitations should be interpreted in a way
that discourages unfounded law suits. 601 P .2d at 148. Thus, "when injuries are

2
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~

suffered that have been caused by an unknown act of negligence ... the law
ought not to be construed to destroy a right of action before a person even
becomes aware of the existence of that right." Id. at 147. Otherwise, a patient is
forced to sue his health care professionals as soon as he is injured and before he
is aware of any fault in his medical care in order to have a right of action. As we
explained when originally adopting this discovery rule, "[i]t seems somewhat
incongruous that an injured person must commence a malpractice action prior to
the time he knew, or reasonably should have known, of his injury and right of
action." Christiansen v. Rees, 20 Utah 2d 199,436 P.2d 435, 436 (Utah
1968). With these concerns in mind, it follows that a patient must not only
suspect negligence in a medical treatment, but must also suspect which treatment
in particular implicates negligent care to avoid pursuing unfounded litigation.

Daniels v. Gamma West Brachytherapy, LLC, 2009 UT 66, ilil 29-30, 221 P.3d 256
(Sup.Ct.).

In this case, the trial court concluded that there were questions of fact about
whether Lee learned of her actual injury after Dr. Dewey treated ~er during her second
pregnancy in 201 I. (R.527-29 & 764-65) Both Dr. Williams in 2008 and Dr. Dewey in
2011 did not order a pre-natal RhoGAM shot for Lee. (R.504 & 528-29) Assuming Lee
did not know she was sensitized until Dr. Dewey informed her in 2011, (R.2955) it is
logical Lee could have believed either physician's failure to order RhoGAM caused her
sensitization/injury. Until Lee knew or should have known of an actual injury and, which
of the two potentially negligent acts may have caused it, the statute of limitations could
~

not commence.
Appellee essentially argues that prior to having knowledge of an actual injury, a
~

patient can determine knowledge of negligence. See Appellee Br. p. 20. Appellee,
however, offers no case law from this or any other jurisdiction to support this premise.

Id.
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Appellee also attempts to distinguish the facts in Daniels with the facts of this
case. See Appellee Br. p. 23. Appellee points out that as of March 2009, Lee knew: (1)
that she was supposed to get a RhoGAM shot when she was pregnant with Chilton; (2)
that the purpose of the shot was to prevent her from becoming Rh-sensitized; and (3) that
she did not receive the shot during her pregnancy 1• Id. Based on these facts, Appellee
argues that "[t]he only possible medical event that could have caused Lee to become Rhsensitized was a failure to receive a RhoGAM shot while she was pregnant [with Chilton
in 2009]". Id. Appellee's argument fails to consider how Dr. Dewey's same potentially
negligent act in 2011 could have caused the same injury. (R.0528-29 & 2955) According
to Lee's testimony it was not until 2011 that she knew of her injury. (R.0528-29, 0563,
0733, 1484-85, 2387, 2455-56, 2463-64, 2549 & 2955)
Lee gave birth to her second child, Bryson on December 16, 2011. (R.528)
Bryson was born with complications requiring blood transfusions. Id. It was at this time
that Mrs. Lee claims she was informed she had developed the antibodies RhoGAM was
designed to prevent (i.e., that she was sensitized/injured). Id. Dr. Dewey admitted that
he thought he made an error by failing to test Lee for Rh-sensitization (inferring that he
should have ordered RhoGAM for her if the test indicated she was not sensitized).
Believing that Bryson's complications were due to Dr. Dewey's neglect, Lee sought an
attorney for purposes of investigating claims against Dr. Dewey. (R.0528-29) It was

1

Dr. Williams testified that even if Lee would have studied the matter on the internet,
and realized she did not receive RhoGAM during her pregnancy, she would have also
probably learned that her likelihood of becoming sensitized/injured in such a case was a
mere one percent ( 1% ). (R.2906-08).

4
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only after her attorney researched the matter, and discovered that Lee had already become
<i

sensitized during her first pregnancy in 2008, that it became clear for the first time to Lee
that Dr. Williams' neglect in 2008 (not Dr. Dewey's in 2011) might have caused the
injury. (R.0528-29)
Here, just as in Daniels, there were two separate medical events that could have
caused the same injury/sensitization. The evidence in the record is sufficient to show that
it was not until after the second potentially negligent event that Lee knew the injury
might have been caused by the first event. It is only when the plaintiff knows which

(j)

negligent event caused the injury that the plaintiff is charged with having knowledge of
negligence sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations. Daniels, 2009 UT 66 at if27
(emphasis added). Therefore, because there were questions of fact about when Lee
learned of her injury, and because there were two different events which could have
caused her injury, there were questions of fact about when Lee learned of Williams'

@

negligence.
This erroneous ruling had the compounding effect of preventing Lee from
introducing several topics and critical evidence which support her response to the statute
of limitations defense: Dr. Dewey's potentially negligent treatment of Lee's 2011
pregnancy (R.0528-29 & 2955); the full context of Dr. Dewey's statements to Lee
(allegedly telling her about her injury/sensitization in 2011 ), Id. Lee's explanation about
how she learned Dr. Williams' negligence in 2008 was the causal event of her injury

b1

(R.0528-29); facts relevant to Dr. Williams' negligence, see Section II, infra; and how
Lee claims to have learned the duties relevant to RhoGAM administration. (R.1842-52)

5
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Said another way, the jury was left with a detailed explanation from Dr. Williams about
when he allegedly informed plaintiff of her injury in 2008, coupled with Lee's admission
about her internet research in 2009. Conversely, Lee was precluded from introducing
detailed evidence of the communications she claims were the basis of her knowledge of
legal injury in 2011-12. (R.2183, 2262 & 2459-65) It is understandable that this
omission in the evidence left the jury with only one side of the story (that of Williams)
which the jury adopted as true. Moreover, this error relieved Dr. Williams from the
burden of proving two necessary elements to his statute of limitations defenseknowledge of negligence, and knowledge of which event caused the injury.

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED EVIDENCE
PERTAINING TO WHETHER AND WHEN LEE LEARNED OF HER
"ACTUAL INJURY".
At trial, Lee attempted to introduce several pieces of evidence relating to whether

and when she learned of her "actual injury" and to rebut when Dr. Williams allegedly
informed Lee of her injury. At issue here, Lee sought to introduce a non-redacted
statement from her January I, 2009 discharge summary, authored by Dr. Williams, as
well as the fact that there was no evidence of an order for RhoGAM in her prenatal
treatment records. Appellee claims that this evidence "is only relevant to the issue of
whether Dr. Williams ordered a RhoGAM shot for Lee while she was pregnant in 2008,
which, in turn, is only relevant to whether Dr. Williams breached the applicable standard
of care in his treatment of Lee." See Appellee Br. p. 26. Appellee further claims that
even if the evidence is probative on the question of when Lee learned of her injury,

6
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"(a]ny probative value as to Dr. Williams' alleged motive was outweighed by its potential

<»

to create unfair prejudice." Id. at 26-27. Finally, Appellee claims that if the district court
did erroneously exclude the evidence, "Lee cannot show that the trial's outcome would
have been different had the evidence been admitted." Id.
A.

The Evidence is Relevant to When Lee Discovered Her Legal Injury.

Appellee's claim that the evidence at issue was only relevant to the question of
negligence is incorrect. The only issue at the statute of limitations trial was whether Lee
knew or reasonably should have known that she had become Rh-sensitized before
®

September 27, 2010. Because of the bifurcation of the trial, the question of whether Dr.
Williams' negligence might have caused the injury was not presented to the jury. While
it is certainly true that lack of an order for RhoGAM and the misstatements in the record

(i

were relevant to any question of negligence, the evidence is also relevant to the question
of whether or not Dr. Williams told Lee of her injury on December 31, 2008 2. In fact, this
(j

conversation on December 31, 2008 was the only evidence Williams offered that Lee
knew of her sensitization/injury prior to September 27, 2010. (R.1863-71)
Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less
probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in
determining the action. Utah R. Evid. 401. The only issue before the jury was when Lee
knew or should have known of her injury.

U1
2

The December 31, 2008 conversation was allegedly memorialized in Lee's discharge
summary dated January 1, 2009. (R.0736)

7
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The only testimony offered by Dr. Williams relevant to whether Lee knew of her
injury/sensitization in 2008 was his claim that he informed her on December 31, 2008
while she was still in the hospital with her son. (R.2879) There were no witnesses to this
conversation, and Dr. Williams does not remember a conversation with Lee after
December 31, 2008 although he thinks it occurred. (R.394-95)
Although Lee claims Dr. Williams never told her of her sensitization/injury, and
she was allowed to offer limited evidence to support her side of the story3, she was not

3

With the exception of Lee's statement that Dr. Williams did not inform her of her
sensitization/injury on December 31, 2008, there were generally only three factual topics Lee
introduced to rebut his testimony that he informed her of her injury: (1) lay witness testimony
confirming that Lee never mentioned her sensitization/injury to close family and friends prior to
2012; (2) medical records showing that it was impossible for Dr. Williams to have known Lee
was sensitized to the D antigen on December 31, 2008 because the test results were not available
until January 5, 2009; and (3) Lee's communications and treatment with Dr. Dewey in 2011.
As to topic 1, Lee was limited after motions in limine to calling two witnesses to testify
that she had not mentioned her sensitization-her husband and a friend. (R.2471-76) Certainly
the jury could have believed these individuals were biased for Lee and not given weight to their
testimony. Lee sought to call other witnesses (family and friends), in part, to testify that she did
not mention her injury/sensitization prior to 2012. (R.0845-46) Plaintiff intended to argue that if
she had known she was injured that she would have told these same family members and friends
because these were the individuals she told when she learned that she became sensitized. Indeed,
the trial Court granted motions in limine preventing plaintiff from calling her closest relative
Mike Forshee (her grandfather). (R.2471-76)
As to topic 2, Plaintiff believed it was persuasive that because Dr. Williams did not have
the test result confirming her sensitization until January 5, 2009, that he could not have informed
her of her sensitization on December 31, 2008. (R.2777 & 2791-92) Yet, he explained to the
jury that he "suspected" she was sensitized to the D antigen because he would have known there
was no order for RhoGAM in her file and the test result showed that she had "antibodies".
(R.2878) These antibodies, however, were unknown until January 5. (R.2777 & 2791-92)
As to topic 3, Lee was only allowed to testify that "Dr. Dewey told her of her
sensitization in 2011," (R.1504 & 2387) but she was not allowed to introduce evidence about the
full context of those comments including Dewey's comment that "Kylie didn't know she was
sensitized, if she did, she didn't tell me." (R.2842-43)

8
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~

allowed to discredit Dr. Williams' version of the conversation on December 31, 2008
with clear falsehoods in the record that day.
It is likely that the jury simply accepted Dr. Williams' testimony regarding the
conversation on December 31, 2008 as true because he offered no other evidence of when
Lee learned of her injury. Thus, evidence tending to disprove Dr. Williams' version on
the conversation on December 31, 2008 was critical for Lee.
(\i

The first evidence that the district court excluded was the following statement
made by Dr. Williams in the January 1, 2009 discharge summary:
I reviewed my standard postpartum teaching. She is Rh negative with
positive antibody screen. We discussed the potential for future
miscarriages due to her positive antibody screen. She did receive a
RhoGAM. As noted her fetal blood screen was negative. She did miss her
26-week RhoGAM which is quite unfortunate and despite having been
ordered.
(R. 736) (emphasis added). The court however, only allowed Lee to introduce this record
with the emphasized portion redacted. (R.2549-40)
~

The second piece of evidence the district court excluded was Dr. Williams' own
admission that nowhere in any of his treatment records was an order for RhoGAM.
(R.464-65, 468-70 & 476-78) This admission clearly contradicts the redacted portion of
the discharge summary and, taken together, contradicts Dr. Williams testimony that he
told Lee of her injury on December 31, 2008.
These two pieces of evidence show misstatements by Williams. The medical
record, in its redacted form, was unreliable as evidence that Dr. Williams actually
informed Lee of her injury because it left the jury with only one explanation of the

vj
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conversations between Dr. Williams and Lee. The medical record in its un-redacted
form, however, and combined with the evidence that there was no record of Dr. Williams
having ordered a RhoGAM shot, tends to cast doubt on the truthfulness of Dr. Williams'
statements in the record and at trial.
Additionally, not only was the un-redacted record relevant to whether Dr.
Williams actually informed Lee of her sensitization/injury, when reviewed with his
medical records lacking an order, the un-redacted record was relevant as to whether Dr.
Williams had motive to conceal the truth of injury from Lee. On December 31, 2008, Dr.
Williams would have known Lee had antibodies which he "suspected" was to the D
antigen (Lee's injury) and he would have seen that his records showed no evidence of
RhoGAM being ordered. The jury should have been allowed to consider these facts
when they were asked whether to believe Dr. Williams' testimony that he informed Lee
of her injury on December 31, 2008.
B.

There Was No Risk of Unfair Prejudice to Dr. Williams Had the
Evidence Been Admitted.

Appellee cites to Utah R. Evid. 403 and claims that the excluded evidence would
have unfairly prejudiced Dr. Williams. See Appellee Br. pp. 28-30. Appellee, however,
does not articulate exactly how such prejudice could occur. Id. Because of the bifurcated
nature of the trial and given the fact that the jury was not deliberating on the question of
negligence, the only question was whether and when Lee learned of her injury. Given
this, the only conclusion possible had the evidence been admitted, was whether Dr.
Williams told Lee of her injury as he claimed. The evidence was not unfairly prejudicial
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~

to Dr. Williams because there was no other element or question before the jury where the
excluded evidence may have caused the jury to answer in an unfairly prejudicial way.
C.

Exclusion of the Evidence Was Prejudicial Error.

Appellee correctly cites the standard that "[a] trial court's ruling regarding the

ti

admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed unless it clearly appears that the court was
in error, and that the error affected a substantial right of the party. See Belden v. Dalbo,
<i

Inc., 752 P.2d 1317, 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted). A party's substantial

right is affected if, absent the error, "there is a reasonable likelihood that a different result
4-i

would have been reached." Id.
We can presume the jury believed Dr. Williams' claim he told Lee of her injury on
December 31, 2008. The jury likely based their determination on Dr. Williams'
testimony 4-without the added context of the excluded evidence-and Lee was certainly
harmed by the exclusion. Furthermore, Lee claims that it is highly likely the jury would

(jj

have arrived at a different result had the evidence been admitted. Therefore, the
exclusion of the evidence effected Lee's substantial rights and the case should be
remanded to the district court with instructions that the subject evidence be admitted.

4

aj

~

It's fair to presume the jury based their decision on Williams' testimony because the
only other "evidence" that Lee knew or should have known of her injury was an
unsupported allegation that then nineteen year old Lee should have collected her medical
records even though her injury was symptomless until the birth of her second child in
2011. (R.1408, 2368 & 2782)
11
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III.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSABLE ERROR
WHEN IT FAILED TO REMOVE JUROR K.H. FOR CAUSE.
A.

Appellant Did Request a Change of Venue Due to the Panel's
Prejudicial Familiarity with the Defendants.

In their Response Brief, Appellee wrongly asserts that Appellant failed to request
a change of venue due to Moab Family Medicine's modest size and Defendants' relative
prominence in the community. See Appellee Br. at pp 10-11. Upon Appellant's
counsel's review of the juror questionnaires, and seeing the high degree of familiarity the
panel had with the defendants, counsel made a motion for change of venue on the record.
(R.2798-2801) The court's ruling against Appellant is recorded at (R.2799) as well as

~

(R.2261).

B.

Appellant Properly Preserved Error Regarding the Empaneling of
Juror K.H.

Appellee asserts that Appellant failed to properly preserve error as to the
empaneling of juror K.H. because "Lee had sufficient information and opportunity to

~

intelligently exercise a peremptory challenge against K.H, but invited error by failing to
object to K.H.' s inclusion on the Jury panel or using available peremptory challenges to
remove K.H." See Appellee Br. at p. 31. In defense of their position, Appellees rely
upon the doctrine of "invited error" as articulated in variety of Utah cases. See Appellee
Br. at pp. 32-33. Appellees' analysis, however, fails to consider the most recent case law
on the matter as issued by the Utah Supreme Court.
In Turner v. University of Utah Hospitals & Clinics, 2013 UT 52,310 P.3d 1212
(Sup.Ct.), the plaintiff sued the Hospital for negligence. Id. at il7. During jury selection,
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~

Turner challenged a number ofjuror's for cause, the majority of which the district court
~

granted. Id. The court, however, denied four of these challenges. Id. Turner also
suspected that a fifth juror had concealed his true feelings during voir dire and, in her
view, posed the greatest threat to a fair trial. Id. Turner therefore had three peremptory
challenges to deal with five potentially biased jurors. Id. Turner decided to spend two of
them on jurors who had been challenged for cause previously, but then she used her final
challenge on the juror whom she suspected of harboring hidden biases. Id. The other
two jurors ended up serving on the jury. Id.

~

When Turner brought up the issue of juror bias on appeal, the appellate court
applied the "cure-or-waive" rule as was articulated in State v. Baker, 93 5 P .2d 503, 510
(Utah 1997) and concluded that because Turner failed to utilize a peremptory strike
against the problematic juror, she had waived her objection on the matter. Turner, 2013
UT 52 at ,r,r12 & 26. At the Supreme Court, Turner argued that application of the rule
yielded an unfair result in her case and that the rule should be modified or clarified. Id. at
125. The Supreme Court agreed with Turner and expressly overruled the cure-or-waive
rule as articulated in Baker.
The Supreme Court, instead, adopted the rule articulated in People v. Hopi, 4 Utah
247, 9 P. 407,408 (Utah Terr. 1886), ajf'd, 120 U.S. 430, 7 S.Ct. 614, 30 L.Ed. 708
(1887). In that case, a defendant had peremptory challenges available but failed to use
them to dismiss a previously challenged juror. Turner, 2013 UT 52 at 131. When the

~

defendant then attempted to argue jury bias on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court held that
"[u]ntil [the defendant] had exhausted his peremptory challenges, he could not complain"

13
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about possible jury bias. Id. The court in Turner went on to say: "[ o ]n the one hand, [the
new rule] requires that the parties utilize all available peremptory challenges before the
issue of jury bias can be raised on appeal. ... [b ]ut as opposed to the cure-or-waive rule,
it does not require the parties to use those challenges in a particular way, thus leaving the
door open to their tactical use." Id. at 132 (emphasis original). The Turner court
concluded, "as long as (a) all of the party's peremptory challenges were used and (b) a
juror who was previously challenged for cause ends up being seated on the jury, the issue
of jury bias has been preserved .... " Id.
Given the Turner court's ultimate overturning of the "cure or waive" rule as
articulated in Baker, Appellee's heavy reliance upon this outdated standard as an
argument that Appellant failed to properly preserve error is incorrect. See Appellee Br.
pp. 32-34. Applying the rule articulated in Turner to this case, it is clear that Appellant
properly preserved error as to the issue of K.H. 's empanelling. Counsel for Appellant
questioned juror K.H. about his potential bias and properly challenged K.H. for cause.
(R.2653-54 & 2656-57) Furthermore, Appellant counsel exercised all available
peremptory strikes on jurors Plaintiff believed expressed biases or who harbored
undisclosed biases. (R.2268 & 2798-99) Therefore, under the Turner standard,
Appellant properly preserved for appeal the issue of K.H. 's empanelling.

C.

K.H.'s Voir Dire Responses Necessitated Removal for Cause.

In their response, Appellees assert two primary arguments in an attempt to
establish K.H. 's responses in voir dire did not necessitate removal for cause. They first
claim that K.H. 's responses in voir dire did not raise a facial presumption of bias. See
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Appellee Br. at pp. 35-37. They second claim that K.H. effectively rebutted any potential
®

bias. Id. at 37-39. As to their first argument, under applicable law, K.H.'s statements
regarding his various and longstanding interactions with Dr. Williams and his practice, as
well as with nurse Connie Wilson are sufficient to create a facial presumption of bias. As
to their second argument, and given the evident potential bias K.H. expressed, K.H. 's
naked assertion of impartiality combined with the district court's slight attempt to rebut
the raised presumption of bias were insufficient to rehabilitate K.H as argued in
Appellant's original brief.

{.i

Facial Presumption of Bias
Voir dire responses revealing evidence of bias or partiality give rise to the
presumption that a potential juror is biased and the juror must be dismissed unless that
presumption is rebutted. West v. Holley, 2004 UT 97,

,r,r 13-14, 103 P .3d 708.

Furthermore, "[i]f contact between a juror and a witness, a party, or court personnel is
(j

more than brief and incidental, presumption of juror bias attaches." State v. Swain, 835
P.2d 1009, 1011 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
In addition, "Jurors are not biased merely because they are acquainted with a party
or witness." Butterfield v. Sevier Valley Hospital, 246 P.3d 120, 129 (Utah Ct. App.
2010); see also C.R. Owens Trucking Corp. v. Stewart, 29 Utah 2d 353, 355 (Utah 1973)
(concluding the fact that prospective jurors were acquainted with the defendant did not,
without further indication of bias or prejudice in favor of defendant, require removal for

@

cause); Chamblee v. Stocks, 344 P.3d 980 (Utah 1959) (stating in a civil trial against the
Grand County Sheriff, fact that all of the jurors either "knew", "knew of' or "were
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acquainted with", the defendant was not dispositive of partiality where "none evidenced
any disposition to try the case other than fairly."). Appellee cites to these same cases to
support their argument that K.H. was in fact unbiased. See Appellee Br. p. 3 7. The juror
statements at issue in these cases, however, do not rise to the level of the relationship here
between K.H. and the defendants and the defense witness in this case.
In Butterfield, the questionable juror merely stated that she knew the treating
doctor and nurse but, in her words, "not that well". Butterfield, 246 P.3d at 128. In C.R.

Owens Trucking Corp., the court noted that the prospective jurors did have an
acquaintance with the defendant, but that the trial court was "careful to exclude from the
panel veniremen who indicated bias or prejudice .... " See C.R. Owens Trucking Corp.,
29 Utah 2d at 355. In Chamblee, the court denied plaintifrs motion to change venue
simply because the defendant happened to be a public official within the community
whom the entire venire knew of. Chamblee, 29 Utah at 980-81.
In this case, K.H. 's statements transcend a "mere acquaintance" and were much
more than "brief or incidental". As to Dr. Williams and the clinic, K.H. admitted that his
wife had been an actual patient of Williams' wife. (R.2653 & 3158) K.H. further
admitted he had been a patient of Williams' clinic; which clinic is a named defendant in
this matter-Moab Family Medicine. 5 (R.2652-53) Additionally, K.H. stated that he
went back to Williams' clinic after "bad experiences with another doctor." Id.
Furthermore, K.H. admitted to knowing Dr. Williams and his wife since they opened
their clinic (R. 2653) which was in operation approximately 15 years at the time of trial.
5

Though it is unclear which provider treated K.H.
16

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

~

(R.2857) As to defense witness Connie Wilson, K.H. admits to not only knowing the
@

witness but that "I know her [because] her son was involved in a scouting program we
had." (R.2652) Taken as a whole, these are all factual statements made during the
selection process that facially raised a multitude of questions of partiality or prejudice
concerning relationships with the defendants and a defense witness. Clearly the
doctor/patient relationship with Dr. Williams as to this juror and his spouse shows a level
of trust and connection rising well above "mere acquaintance". Furthermore, this
relationship-coupled with the intricate social interactions between K.H. and defense

(i)

witness Nurse Wilson--casts serious doubt on the juror's neutrality.
"A juror, who through a personal association with a witness or a party has
developed a relationship of affection, respect, or esteem, cannot be deemed disinterested,

~

indifferent, or impartial." Butterfield, 2010 OT App 357, 121 (internal citations omitted).
Certainly a relationship of respect and esteem between K.H. and Williams can be inferred
@

because K.H. admitted to he and his wife having an ongoing doctor/patient relationship
with Moab Family Medicine.
Given the statements and admissions at issue, K.H. should fairly have been
presumed biased and the presumption should have been sufficiently rebutted or he should
have been excused for cause.

D.

Appellant Need Not Show K.H. Was Actually Biased Against Her.

Appellees allege in their brief that Appellant must show "actual bias" on the part
~

of the individual juror, K.H. See Appellee Br. p. 39. This proposition is incorrect.
Appellant relies on the criminal case of State v. MacNeill, 380 P.3d 60 (Utah Ct. App.
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(j

2016). That case, however, involved a denied request for a change of venue, Id. at 65,
and did not involve the issue of a biased individual juror.

Additionally, the crux of the

MacNeill decision was that the defendant had '"passed the jury for cause" and therefore
waived any argument as to partiality. Id. Furthermore, there is nothing in Butterfield or
other cases of which Appellant is aware that suggests evidence of actual bias is necessary
as to an individual juror.

IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PROPERLY INSTRUCT THE
JURY.
In their response, Appellees mischaracterize Appellant's first argument on this

question. Appellant did not and does not claim that "actual knowledge of injury" is
required to trigger the statute of limitations. See Appellee Br. pp. 40-42. Appellant fully
agrees with Appellee's analysis that the proper standard is actual or constructive
knowledge of an injury. Id. Indeed, in her initial brief, Appellant cites to Seale v.

Gowans for that very premise. See Applt. Br. p. 27. Instead, Appellant argues that the
proper instruction should have been "whether or not Lee knew or should have known of
an actual injury" as opposed to whether or not Appellant "knew or should have known ..
. that she might have suffered an injury." Id. at 26-27 (R.2284) (emphasis added).
Furthermore, the improper wording of the given instruction fails to "naturally answer"
the causation question as Appellee asserts. See Appellee Br. pp. 42-43.

A.

By Using the Word "Might" in the Given Instruction and Jury Verdict
Form, the District Court Invited Improper Jury Deliberation.

The jury instruction relating to the discovery rule read: "[ d]iscovery of an injury
from medical malpractice occurs when an ordinary person through reasonable diligence
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knows or should know that she might have sustained an injury. (R.2284)(emphasis
added). The given question on the verdict form was as follows: "Do you find that
Defendants have established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Kylie Lee knew or
should have known, by September 27, 2010, that she might have suffered an injury."
(R.2288) (emphasis added). This wording improperly and impermissibly lowers the
degree of actual or constructive knowledge required to trigger the statute of limitations.

It is not until the patient knows or should know of an actual injury that the statute
of limitations begins to run. Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1363 (Utah 1996).
Additionally, the injury must be made "manifest" and it is not enough that there exists a
possibility or even a probability of harm. Id. at 1364-65. Furthermore, under the
discovery rule, it is knowledge of injury that triggers the statute-not notice of probable
or possible injury. Id. As the rule is incorporated in the Model Utah Jury Instruction, the
first element to be determined is simply whether or not the patient knew or should have
known "that she sustained an injury." See M.U.J.I. 2nd CV 325. There is no speculative
modifier contained in this element, i.e. "might". Such wording in the first element is
legally sensible given the case law to which the Model Instruction cites indicates the
injury must be "actual" and "manifest"-not speculative or even probable. Seale, 923
P.2d at 1364-65. Finally, this is the more appropriate standard because tolling the statute
of limitations until the potential harm actually manifests itself allows for more certain
proof and fewer speculative lawsuits. Id.
In using the phrases "might have sustained an injury"(R.2284) and "might have
suffered an injury", (R.2288) the court invited the jury to improperly consider that Mrs.
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Lee might have thought her injury was possible or probable well before it was actual and
manifest. This necessarily results in an improper application of the discovery rule to the
facts of the case. In this case, the symptomless injury was not manifest until after the
birth of her second child in 2011. Had they deliberated over the proper question, the jury
would likely have come to a different conclusion.

B.

The District Court Should Have Instructed the Jury to Decide the
Causation Element.

Appellee responds that there was no need to instruct the jury on the element of
causation because "[b]efore trial, the district court properly determined that Lee knew or
should have known that Dr. Williams' failure to give her a RhoGAM shot during her first
pregnancy was potentially negligent" and that "[a]s a result, the issue at trial was whether
Lee knew or should have known of her sensitization by September 27, 2010." See
Appellee Br. p. 42. For reasons already discussed in section I supra, the trial court
introduced an improper standard into its summary judgment analysis; therefore, the
question of causation was not "naturally answered".
The jury instruction as presented in M.U.J.I. 2nd CV 325, along with the case law
which is the basis of the instruction, not only requires a plaintiff know or should know
that she "sustained an injury" to trigger limitations, but that the plaintiff also know or
should know both the cause of the injury as well as the possibility of the provider's fault
in causing the injury. M.U.J.I. 2nd CV 325. In this case, the court wholly failed to
include these additional required elements. R.2284. This was obvious error given the
fact that proving each and every element under the rule, by preponderance of the
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evidence, was the Defendants' burden.

V.

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT APPROPRIATELY ADDRESS
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CONVERSATION WITH NURSE WILSON.

A medical provider's duty of confidentiality prohibits disclosure of confidential
information received through the provider-patient relationship. Sorensen v. Barbuto, 177
P .3d 614, 617 (Utah 2008). The Utah Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff-patient
treating provider may not engage in ex parte communications with defense counsel. Id.
at 619. If a treating provider intends to engage in ex parte communications with defense
counsel regarding his or her treatment of a patient, the provider must provide the patient
with reasonable advance notice. Wilson v. IHC Hospitals, Inc., 289 P.3d 369, 394 (Utah
2012).
In this case, it is undisputed that defense counsel engaged in an ex-parte
conversation with Nurse Wilson the night before Wilson's testimony at trial. (R.2740)
Defendant did not dispute that Nurse Wilson worked a non-party treating medical
facility. (R.2722) Defendant also did not dispute that Wilson was a medical provider who
owes a duty of confidentiality to her patients of the facility at which she is employed.
This leaves only two issues: ( 1) whether Nurse Wilson was a "treating provider" for
purposes of Barbuto and Wilson; and (2) whether the ex-parte conversation was of the
types prohibited under those cases.
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A.

Nurse Wilson Was a Treating Provider for Lee During the Subject
Pregnancy.
i.

It was Undisputed that Nurse Wilson was a Treating Provider and
Plaintiff's Medical Records are Proof of tltis Fact.

In their Response, Appellees argue, for the first time, that Connie Wilson was not
involved in Lee's treatment. See Appellant Br. p. 44. They claim that "[w]hile it was
initially believed that Ms. Wilson was involved in Lee's delivery of Chilton, the parties
discovered during Ms. Wilson's deposition that this belief was mistaken." Id. This
allegation is false for two reasons. First, during trial and well after Wilson's deposition,
Defense counsel admitted on the record that Connie Wilson "was involved in Ms. Lee's
care during the delivery of her first child." (R.2655) Thus, it was undisputed that Nurse
Wilson was a "treating provider" and there was no need for Plaintiffs counsel to argue or
~

explore the issue further.
Additionally, in no less than ten (10) pages of Lee's medical records, Wilson's full
signature or initials appear as the identified treating nurse or discharge nurse. While
these medical records were not originally part of the record on appeal, the parties have
agreed to their inclusion for this court's purposes and these records are contained in the
Addenda infra.
There is simply no basis to assert or believe that Nurse Wilson was not a treating
medical provider for Lee. As such, and under the applicable cases addressing this matter,
any ex-parte communication between Wilson and Defense counsel are subject to scrutiny.
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ii.
(j

Even Assuming Nurse Wilson Never Treated Plaintiff, Nurse
Wilson was Employed at a Non-Party Treating Medical Facility
and Owed a Duty of Co11jidentiality to Plaintiff.

Assuming Appellee's argument is correct that Lee was never treated by Wilson,
though Appellant asserts there is strong evidence to the contrary, the question that
follows is whether a nurse at a non-party facility where a plaintiff has received medical
treatment owes a duty of confidentiality to the plaintiff. Appellees have not argued that
the duty of confidentiality should not apply to nurses or non-party facilities. Utah R.
Evid. 506, advisory committee's note (3) answers this question and states that the
@

physician-patient privilege "'includes those who are participating in the diagnosis and
treatment under the direction of the physician .... " Furthermore, the Utah Medical
Malpractice Act defines a nurse as a "healthcare provider". See Utah Code Ann. § 78B3-403( 12). Although the malpractice act does not articulate the confidentiality rules, it is
difficult to imagine that the duty of confidentiality wouldn't extent to those individuals

Q}

defined as "healthcare providers".
Additionally, and regardless of whether or not Wilson actively treated Lee, by
virtue of her employment at a non-party treating facility, she had access to Lee's personal
and confidential medical information-the very same information the Utah Supreme
Court has sought to protect. The court in Wilson distinguished between two types of
providers-those employed by a defendant and those not employed by a defendant. The
court concluded its discussion as follows:
IHC met ex parte with two categories of treating physicians, those it did not
employ and those it did. The meetings with Dr. Boyer, whom IHC did not
employ were improper. However, its ex parte meetings with the Employed
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Physicians were permissible to the extent that the Wilsons placed the
conduct of the Employed Physicians at issue under a theory of vicarious
liability.
Wilson, 289 P.3d, at 397. The clear touchstone for determining whether a defendant's ex

parte communication is proper or improper is the condition of the medical provider's
employment. Had defense counsel in this case communicated with a nurse employed by
either defendant, the ex parte communication would be completely proper. Such,
however, was not the case and defense counsel instead communicated ex parte with a
provider not employed by either defendant.
Nurse Wilson worked at a non-party treating medical facility (R.2722) and by
virtue of that status, Wilson owed the same duties to Lee as any "treating physician" for
purposes of this analysis.
B.

The Ex-Parte Communication Between Nurse Wilson And Defense
Counsel was the Type Prohibited Under Barbuto and Wilson.

Appellee asserts that because evidence at trial suggested that the substance of
Wilson's and Defense counsel's ex-parte communication did not include any
conversation regarding confidential information, that there was no violation of the
standards set out in Barbuto and Wilson. See Appellee Br. p. 44-45. While it is true that
the protection of a patient's confidential information is of prime importance in
prohibiting such communications, see Barbuto, 2008 UT 8, at, 12, protecting such
information is only one of the considerations supporting this prohibition. "[E]x-parte
communication between a treating provider and opposing counsel would make it
impossible for a patient or a court to appropriately monitor the scope of the provider's
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disclosures. Id. at, 23. Monitoring the scope of the communication between a treating
provider and opposing counsel is important because "an unauthorized ex-parte interview
could disintegrate into a discussion of the impact of a jury's award upon a physician's
professional reputation, the rising cost of malpractice insurance premiums, the notion that
the treating provider might be the next person to be sued, and other topics which might
influence the provider's views." Wilson, 289 P.3d at, 87 (quoting Manion v. NP. W
~

Medical Center, Inc., 676 F. Supp. 585, 594-95 (M.D. Penn. 1987). The duty of counsel
not to communicate with plaintiffs medical providers exists because opposing counsel
~

naturally "has interests adverse to the patient." Id. at, 91. Appellee's response does
nothing to address this equally important consideration.
In this case, the ex-parte communication at issue is the exact type prohibited by

Barbuto and Wilson. Defense counsel communicated about Wilson's testimony at trial
and Plaintiff was not afforded the opportunity to monitor whether that discussion
devolved into anything improper. While Defense counsel and Wilson both deny that
anything improper was discussed, such denials should be expected.
Upon remand of this case, Appellant requests that she be afforded full opportunity
to engage in sufficient discovery similar to the procedure in the Wilson case on remand to
fully ascertain the context and content of the conversation and that the district court
properly consider an appropriate remedy.
Date this 16th day of February, 2017
YOUNG,K
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